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Abstract 
In the following dialogue Professor Lionel Naccache engages Prof Jenny Kitzinger and Dr 
Gabrielle Samuels in debate about their recent JOMEC Journal paper about news 
reporting of consciousness in coma patients (Kitzinger and Samuel 2013). Professor 
Naccache’s letter appears first, followed by a response from Kitzinger and Samuel. 
Contributor Notes 
Professor Lionel Naccache is a neurologist and hold a PhD in cognitive neurosciences 
from Paris VI University. His thesis, written under the supervision of Professor Stanislas 
Dehaene, is entitled The Subliminal Perception of Numbers: Psychological Properties and 
Functional Brain Imaging of Unconscious Cognitive Processes. He now works both as a 
neurologist in the unit for nervous system diseases at Pitié-Salpêtrière in Paris, and as a 
professor at Paris VI University. He is co-director of the Neuropsychology and 
Neuroimaging unit (INSERM, the French National Institute of Health and Medical 
Research) within the ICM (Institut du Cerveau et de la Moëlle épinière). He has published 
essays on neurosciences of consciousness and subjectivity. His primary interest is the 
cerebral basis of consciousness. 
Jenny Kitzinger is Professor of Communications Research at Cardiff University School of 
Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. She is also co-director of the York-Cardiff Chronic 
Disorders of Consciousness Group. Jenny’s work focuses on health and science issue – 
previous books have addressed the AIDS crisis, the history of sexual violence, and, more 
recently, human genetic research. She is currently researching family experiences of 
severe brain injury. 
Gabrielle Samuel is a Wellcome Trust funded PhD student in Medical sociology at the 
Centre for Biomedicine and Society at Brunel University, London. Her research interests 
include the social and ethical issues surrounding innovative health technologies and the 
portrayal of science/technology in the media. Gabrielle also has an interest in biomedical 
ethics and is a member of the London and Brighton Translational Ethics Centre (LABTEC). 
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A few comments about ‘Reporting 
consciousness in coma’ by Samuel 
and Kitzinger – Lionel Naccache 
Dear Editors, 
I was very interested by the recent report 
of Samuel and Kitzinger in JOMEC 
journal, entitled ‘Reporting 
consciousness in coma’ (2013), 
dedicated to the study of how the media 
framing of neuro-scientific research 
impacts on families with relatives being 
in the vegetative or minimally conscious 
state. As being directly concerned by this 
issue both as a neurologist taking care of 
such patients and of their families, and 
as a researcher in this field, I would like 
to congratulate the authors for their 
original work which should stimulate 
similar research in social sciences, and 
also to react on two points. I will first 
begin by clarifying a misunderstanding 
related to a citation of an editorial I 
published in Science magazine in 2006.  
1) What I meant by ‘rich mental life’ in
the 2006 Science editorial? 
Samuel and Kitzinger analyzed the 
impact of a seminal functional brain-
imaging case-study exploring brain 
activity of a patient clinically defined as 
being in the vegetative state. In this 
article published in Science in 2006, 
Owen and colleagues (2006) used the 
fMRI signal to detect two reproducible 
and sustained patterns of brain activity 
specific to two distinct mental imagery 
tasks: ‘imagine playing tennis’ and 
‘imagine walking through your house’ 
respectively. Samuel and Kitzinger then 
cited my editorial in the same issue of 
Science, in which I wrote that this study 
indicates the presence of a ‘rich mental 
life’ (Naccache 2006), and they 
interpreted my paper as source of 
‘potential confusion about the level of 
cognitive ability detected by fMRI’ 
(Samuel and Kitzinger 2013). I agree that 
the ‘cut-and-paste’ extraction of these 3 
words (‘rich mental life’) may be 
confusing, but I regret the authors did 
not pay attention – or did not report – 
the general tone of my article in which I 
tried to expose with clarity the interest 
and limitations of this study, and 
discussed the perspectives of this new 
promising approach. My editorial was 
even entitled ‘Is she conscious?’ to 
emphasize the questions raised by this 
study rather than drawing oversimplified 
conclusions. In this editorial I proposed a 
very balanced interpretation of this 
important study. These three words 
meant that, indeed, finding in this patient 
the very same robust and reproducible 
neural signature of a complex cognitive 
task as the one measured in conscious 
controls during the same task, was a 
strong evidence for the existence of rich 
cognitive abilities including in particular 
semantic and executive processes. One 
issue I discussed in this paper was the 
interpretation of this result as a univocal 
sign of conscious processing: in 
particular because during the last 20 
years we (and many other researchers) 
discovered many high-level cognitive 
processes operating unconsciously both 
in controls and in many distinct 
neurological patients (see for instance 
reviews and discussions in (Dehaene and 
Naccache 2001; Naccache 2006); 
(Naccache 2008)). In other terms, I 
meant that there was univocal existence 
of rich cognitive processes in this 
patient, but I discussed at length the 
difficulty to infer with certainty that she 
was (or not) conscious and experienced 
first person perspective contents. I even 
proposed methodological developments 
to address this decisive and tough issue. 
My paper closed by stating explicitly that 
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this study was: ‘not totally convincing on 
the issue of consciousness’. After reading 
Samuel and Kitzinger paper, I consider I 
may have used the expression ‘rich 
cognitive processes’ rather than ‘rich 
mental life’ in order to avoid the 
confusion with a univocal conscious 
subjective content experiences by the 
patient in first person perspective. This is 
also probably what my colleagues 
Joseph Fins and Nicholas Schiff (2006) 
expressed in their own paper criticizing 
my expression (I discovered their paper 
after reading Samuel and Kitzinger’ 
article). I only regret that Samuel and 
Kitzinger – who criticize with reason 
superficial reading of sources – only 
reproduced a very small ‘chunk’ of my 
editorial, while missing the general tone 
of the paper. Actually, I’m very concerned 
by these issues with the patients and 
families I’m taking care of, and all my 
public conferences, articles and books 
(see for instance the dedicate chapter in 
my essay ‘Perdons-nous connaissance?’ 
(Naccache 2010)) attest of my concern 
about illegitimate claims derived from 
these new promising tools, and about 
the complex and highly variable impact 
of these studies on families and relatives 
of patients. As most of my colleagues, 
when I examine a patient and explore his 
brain structure and activity, I also spend 
time before and after (and usually keep 
contact later in time) with his relatives. 
This relation with relatives is not only 
crucial, but on many occasions it is even 
more important than the diagnostic 
stage itself (see below) to help them live 
with such complex situations. Therefore, 
whereas I completely share with Samuel 
and Kitzinger the necessity to 
permanently question both the way we 
(as physicians and scientists) 
communicate to society, and the way 
our works are framed in media, I am left 
with a bitter taste of unfair treatment in 
their paper.  
2) Respect the complexity of the
subject and avoid ‘plot’ theories 
While I found Samuel and Kitzinger 
contribution profound and questioning, I 
was left on several occasions with an 
impression of over-simplification. Three 
illustrations may clarify this impression.  
First, the authors regularly refer to 
explicit motivations of scientists 
emphasizing too much their results, 
regardless of illegitimate hopes elicited 
by this form of bold communication in 
minds of relatives of patients: ‘Such 
‘promises’ can be made via practices in 
the lab, grant applications, publications, 
and via press releases and media 
statements’ (1) and ‘part of a deliberate 
effort by scientists (and science funding 
bodies) to promote their work and enroll 
support and resources for its 
development’ (10). Such behaviors may 
exist, – of course – but I’m not certain 
this explanatory statement fully covers 
the complexity of scientific commun-
ication behaviors. I think most of these 
behaviors stem from implicit processes 
driven by the organization of science and 
medical systems (importance of impact-
factor, or scientific and medical fame), 
rather than from deliberate explicit 
strategies of individuals (‘plot theory’-like 
explanations). I’m sorry to refer again to 
my personal case, but my introspection 
does not reveal me to be a greedy and 
selfish Mr Hyde hidden deeply behind 
the physician and scientist I have tried to 
be for years now, a physician full of 
limitations obviously but who tries to act 
and to communicate honestly. Never-
theless, I fully agree on the importance 
to dissect these complex systemic 
processes which are probably at the 
origin of biases in the way scientists 
communicate to society, and in 
particular in such a specific field. 
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My second illustration is related to the 
obvious fact that relatives of chronic 
vegetative state or minimally conscious 
state patients have to go through 
complex psychological processes 
including denial, the mourning process, 
and acceptance of a new condition for 
their loved ones. This irrepressible chain 
of processes shows a large inter-
individual variability. Therefore, one has 
to be particularly cautious when trying to 
find explanatory variables. In the paper, 
Samuel and Kitzinger fairly described 
subjective reactions of some relatives to 
fMRI and similar neuroscientific methods. 
However, neuropsychology taught us that 
while subjective reports are a rich source 
of information about how the individual 
consciously feels about himself and 
about the world, one does not have to 
take these reports at face value in terms 
of explanatory power. When an individual 
goes through a mourning process 
he/she will spontaneously reinterpret 
previous beliefs and hopes, and therefore 
it is highly difficult to establish causality 
links here: does she/he regret her/his 
previous beliefs in fMRI because of the 
way she/he was informed about these 
technics; or alternatively is the mourning 
process (or similar psychological 
process) explaining her/his change of 
mind regarding these tools irrespective 
of the way she/he was informed about 
their existence? I do not have the answer, 
obviously, and I don’t think there is any 
definitive answer for a given individual. 
However, one should be lucid of these 
complex intermingling processes when 
dealing with the issue raised by Samuel 
and Kitzinger. This argument is not 
framed here to discourage any effort in 
the field by shaking the repulsing 
‘complexity’ argument. On the contrary 
should I say, but lucidity is here even 
more mandatory than elsewhere. 
Finally, I consider that the authors should 
have used the same rigorous attitudes 
they advise with wisdom to others (e.g.: 
avoidance of superficial processing of 
sources’; lucidity of motivations behind 
the official discourses). As a scientist and 
physician used to describe patients or 
subjects in articles without using 
strategies prone to elicit empathetic 
feelings in readers, I was a bit surprised 
by the use of false names when 
describing patients and relatives: ‘In the 
interests of confidentiality, all names 
used in this article have been changed 
to pseudonyms’. (1) Typically, one may 
use generic labels (patient #1, relative#1, 
or acronyms, P1). If the name of a 
subject is false, but is still deliberately 
used as a name in an article, what can 
be the motivation of its presence in the 
text except the goal of eliciting emotional 
identification processes in the reader? 
This remark is not stated as a severe 
critique of the paper, but rather as a call 
for lucidity and humility. When promoting 
an ethical attitude, please do not forget 
yourself in the process, even if in the 
present case this technique of name-
substitution is frequent in non-scientific 
media.  
Beyond these issues and mild criticisms, 
I would like to sincerely congratulate 
again the authors. We should definitively 
enrich our knowledge of the way 
relatives are affected by communication 
of scientists and physicians in order to 
improve our communication behaviors. 
I’m ready to further contribute, with them 
and others, to this long-standing effort. 
Very cordially yours, 
Prof Lionel Naccache 
	  www.cf.ac.uk/JOMECjournal 
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A response to Naccache’s comment 
on ‘Reporting consciousness in coma’ 
– Jenny Kitzinger and Gabby Samuel
Dear Editors, 
We appreciate Lionel Naccache’s positive 
comments on our paper (Samuel and 
Kitzinger 2013), and also his critical 
engagement with some of what we wrote 
(Nacchache, JOMEC, this issue). We 
respond to the issues he raises below. 
1) ‘Rich mental life’:
We stand by our claim that Naccache’s 
reference to the fMRI findings as 
demonstrating a ‘rich mental life’ in 
seemingly unconscious, severely brain 
injured patients was a source of 
potential confusion. However, on 
reflection we think it would have been 
useful and courteous to state that 
Naccache’s comment about a ‘rich 
mental life’ did not reflect the general 
tone of his editorial and to reference 
work in which he raises concerns about 
illegitimate claims and the complex 
impact of these studies on families. We 
hope that Naccache’s summary of his 
position (JOMEC journal, this issue) will 
serve to clarify this issue, as well as 
offering a useful complement to our 
article in discussing some of the 
complex issues involved in interpreting 
the fMRI research. 
2) Conspiracy/Plot theories:
Naccache questions our statements 
about the promise-making activities of 
scientists. As we said in our article, our 
research is built on and develops 
research on the ‘sociology of 
expectations’ and the ‘political economy 
of hope’ (see references in our original 
article). This is a body of work which has 
explored the ways in which scientific 
research and development is commonly 
justified – e.g., by claims of imminent 
medical breakthroughs – and how these 
promises can be framed to attract 
sponsors or enrol a supportive policy 
context. Our assertion – particularly 
flagged up as problematic by Naccache 
– that ‘Such ‘promises’ can be made via
practices in the lab, grant applications, 
publications, and via press releases and 
media statements’ as ‘part of a 
deliberate effort by scientists (and 
science funding bodies) to promote their 
work and enrol support and resources 
for its development’ was designed to do 
no more than set the context for our 
particular focus on press releases and 
the media. We treated these ideas as 
simply a jumping-off point for our own 
study, and in so doing we perhaps failed 
to convey the sophistication and 
complexity of their theoretical perspect-
ive which has little in common with the 
caricatured notions of evil scientists 
conspiring for power criticized by 
Naccache. We certainly did not intend to 
conjure up the Jekyll and Hyde image 
Naccache invokes when he seeks to 
rebut our claim with his observation that 
‘introspection does not reveal me a 
greedy and selfish Mr Hyde hidden 
deeply behind the physician and 
scientist I’m trying to be…, a physician 
full of limitations obviously but who tries 
to act and to communicate honestly’. 
Rather we are trying to understand 
individual actions in the context (as we 
said in our article) of ‘the institutional 
and structural’ forces that promote hype 
and we agree with Naccache that 
attempts to address this issue will need 
to look at such context. This is 
something we have highlighted in other 
work too. For example, one of us (JK) 
served on the Nuffield Council on 
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Bioethics working party on ‘Novel 
neurotechnologies: intervening in the 
brain’, stewarding the section on 
communicating science which concludes 
with a recommendation that: 
government, higher education 
funding councils and universities 
reflect on the effects that the 
‘impact agenda’ might be having 
on the ways in which the promises 
and limitation of novel 
neurotechnologies are commun-
icated by academic institutions 
and their researchers. [NCoB 2013: 
220] 
Use of pseudonyms rather than ID 
numbers:  
Naccache comments that ‘as a scientist 
and physician’ he is used to using 
‘patient #1’ or ‘relative#2’, and expresses 
surprise – and some concern – about 
our use of pseudonyms: ‘what can be the 
motivation [for using a pseudonym]’, he 
asks, ‘except the goal of eliciting 
emotional identification?’ This is an 
important issue because this surprise 
and concern highlights a difference of 
disciplinary practice. We did not in fact 
consider the pros and cons of 
pseudonyms (in comparison with 
numeric identifiers) when we wrote our 
paper. We used them by default – a 
position that reflects our socialization 
into social sciences/humanities research 
traditions. But, on reflection, it is also a 
practice rooted in our commitment to 
presenting research participants 
empathetically – trying to understand 
their beliefs and perspectives, even when 
(perhaps especially when) they differ 
from our own – and help readers to 
engage with the stories told by 
participants. Rather than see the 
potential of pseudonyms to elicit 
identification as a problem we, in 
common with many qualitative 
researchers, value such an approach (e.g. 
see Cassell 2005: 190). In social science 
text books pseudonyms are 
recommended in preference to letter 
and numerical codes, to ‘give more life to 
interview excerpts’ (Schilling 2013: 253) 
and to make them ‘more memorable’ 
and help ‘readers navigate their way 
through the analysis’ (Wood et al., 2009: 
157). We believe we would lose 
something of the quality of our data if we 
re-worded extracts from our original 
article to read (for example) that ‘Relative 
#9’ said “it’s not something that I could 
personally put Patient #6 through…. it’s 
modern technology that has put Patient 
#6 where she is today”’. One author, JK, is 
working on a larger network of research 
into disorders of consciousness in 
collaboration with colleagues from 
across Cardiff University and the 
University of York (e.g., Kitzinger and 
Kitzinger 2013 a, b; Halliday et al 2014, 
Holland et al 2014) and pseudonyms are 
also the identification of preference for 
this larger body of work. Given that this 
more extensive study included 
sometimes conducting separate 
interviews with several members of the 
same family, the strategy of using 
numeric codes could be even more 
problematic for some of these data 
extracts which might end up something 
like:  
I asked Relative #34 to talk to the 
doctor about Patient #26 and she 
asked Relative #35 [other sister] to 
come with her and [Relative #35] 
said ‘Relative#15, why don’t you 
talk to the doctor yourself?’ And I 
said, because he doesn’t pay 
attention to anything I say. (R15) 
Experimenting with ‘neutral’ numeric 
identifiers confirms for us what other 
	  www.cf.ac.uk/JOMECjournal 
7	  
@JOMECjournal	  
commentators suggest – that personal 
stories ‘defy the anonymity of a number’ 
(Seidman 2013: 9) and that ‘pseudonyms 
remind us that [this] is about individuals, 
not cases or numbers’ (Morash 2010: 
21). Research participants may also have 
preferences here. For example, the 
Health Experience Research Group at 
Oxford University which is custodian of 
almost 3000 narrative interviews with 
patients informing the healthtalk-
online.com website originally assigned 
numbers to interviewees, but found that 
participants preferred an alias (Zeibland 
2014: personal communication). The 
same proved true with the new research 
participants in the on-going research 
being conducted for the healthtalkonline 
website by Jenny Kitzinger and Celia 
Kitzinger: when (prompted by Naccache’s 
letter) interviewees were asked what they 
would prefer, there was a clear 
preference for pseudonyms. For 
example; one interviewee responded 
robustly: ‘I am a person not a number’.  
4) Use of self-report data:
This leads into the final point which is 
the challenge of how one treats self-
report data. Naccache comments that 
family members of patients in a 
vegetative state (PVS) or minimally 
conscious state (MCS) ‘go through 
complex psychological processes 
including denial, mourning process, and 
acceptation of a new condition for their 
beloved’ and that during this process 
they may ‘spontaneously reinterpret 
previous beliefs and hopes’. He argues 
that as such family members’ reports do 
not have to be taken at face value. This is 
an important point: it is well established 
in social science research that self-
report data is subject to influences such 
as social desirability effects, interviewer 
effects, fallible memories and faulty 
understandings (Miller and Glassner 
2011). Indeed, we can confirm this on 
the basis of data from one of the 
author’s (JK’s) involvement in the larger 
on-going research study mentioned 
above. Different and sometimes 
conflicting or incompatible ‘facts’ about 
the patient and his or her treatment are 
sometimes conveyed in interviews with 
different members of the patient’s family. 
The research also shows that even the 
same person, interviewed on a second 
occasion some months or years later, 
can give a significantly different account 
of key events. One current initiative is to 
carry out a comparative analysis of a 
family member’s account of a particular 
experimental neuroscience interventions 
on her relative at two different points in 
time: first when the interviewee was still 
hopeful that the patient might recover, 
and then, some years later, when she no 
longer believed that recovery was 
possible. Insights from this work, as well 
as the wider debate about the benefits 
and risks of ‘transparent’, ‘discourse 
analytic’ or ‘psychoanalytic’ interpret-
ations of narratives, inform our 
agreement with Naccache that a 
‘transparent’ approach to interview data 
has its limitations – and we certainly 
consider that it prudent to explore 
alternatives (see Kitzinger and Wilkinson 
1997). 
We accept that the problems of taking 
retrospective data at face value make it 
‘highly difficult to establish causality links’ 
and we are not trying to make 
straightforward causal claims of ‘X 
causes Y’. Our work on ‘consciousness in 
coma’ is not a ‘media effects’ study. The 
strongest ‘causal’ term we use is where 
we refer to an interviewee’s excitement 
about fMRI having been first ‘triggered’ by 
a media report. In using the word 
‘triggered’ we sought to allow for the 
wider context of how, for example, the 
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interviewee’s access to other information 
and the dynamics of hope in such a 
traumatic situation may contribute to 
any response to an individual item of 
news. As clinicians often indicate (and as 
is echoed by research participants’ own 
reflections) what ‘triggers’ excitement/ 
hope may be embedded in a much 
wider context. The hope invested in an 
experimental intervention/assessment 
may not be simply dependent on what is 
presented in any particular newspaper 
report or on what the scientist/clinician 
says to a family member when 
presenting the study in any particular 
encounter. There may also be a 
difference between what is stated (e.g. in 
a newspaper report or a consultation) 
and what is understood and recalled by 
the reader/family member. This is one 
reason why any publicity about novel 
neuroscience, or the offer of new 
intervention, has to be handled with such 
care. In order to address this Jenny 
Kitzinger is now involved in developing a 
new programme of research that, it is 
hoped, will include video recording 
consultations about treatment decisions, 
including, if possible, consultations about 
involving patients in experimental 
research. 
In conclusion, we note that self-report 
data from all interviewees has its 
limitations (as identified above). It is 
important not to disqualify our 
interviewees’ accounts in particular on 
the basis of the ‘mourning’ and ‘complex 
psychological processes’ that they have 
experienced as family members of a 
PVS/MCS patient (see Kitzinger and 
Kitzinger 2014). Our interviewees’ 
accounts can not be treated at face 
value nor do they transparently convey 
causal explanations – but we believe 
there is positive potential in looking to 
family members as a source of insight 
contributing to good practice in this area 
– whether that is as part of a jigsaw to
reflect on the representation of fMRI in 
public discourse (Samuel and Kitzinger 
2013), to try to improve experiences of 
long-term care (Latchem and Kitzinger 
2012), or to focus on the practices and 
context of decision making about 
medical treatment (Kitzinger and 
Kitzinger, 2013a, b). 
We would like to thank Lionel Naccache 
for provoking us to deeper thought about 
our engagement with this debate and 
reflection on our methods. We hope that 
social scientists, scientists and 
physicians can work together to continue 
efforts to improve communication – in 
medical/research consultations, media 
relations and public debate – and look 
forward to future collaborations and 
engagement. 
Yours faithfully 
Prof Jenny Kitzinger and Dr Gabrielle 
Samuel 
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